in Glover, 1999, pp. 88–89.
114. Dehumanization and demonization in genocide: Goldhagen, 2009. See also Haslam, 2006.
115. Murderous ideology: Epigraph for this chapter, from Solzhenitsyn, 1973/1991, pp. 173–74.
116. Ancestry myths: Geary, 2002.
117. Intuitive economics: Caplan, 2007; Caplan & Miller, 2010; Fiske, 1991, 1992, 2004a; Sowell, 1980, 2005.
118. Mobility of middlemen minorities: Sowell, 1996.
119. Violence against middlemen minorities: Chirot, 1994; Courtois et al., 1999; Glover, 1999; Horowitz, 2001; Sowell, 1980, 2005.
120. Marxism and Christianity: Chirot & McCauley, 2006, pp. 142–43.
121. Nazism and the book of Revelation: Chirot & McCauley, 2006, p. 144. See also Ericksen & Heschel, 1999; Goldhagen, 1996; Heschel, 2008; Steigmann-Gall, 2003.
122. Psychological traits of utopian tyrants: Chirot, 1994; Glover, 1999; Oakley, 2007.
123. Mao’s callousness: Glover, 1999, p. 291.
124. Mao’s harebrained schemes: Chirot & McCauley, 2006, p. 144; Glover, 1999, pp. 284–86.
125. Neighboring ethnic groups usually don’t commit genocide: Brown, 1997; Fearon & Laitin, 1996; Harff, 2003; Valentino, 2004.
126. Germans anti-Semitic but not genocidal: Valentino, 2004, p. 24.
127. Democides committed by armed minority: Mueller, 2004a; Payne, 2005; Valentino, 2004.
128. Division of labor in democides: Valentino, 2004. See also Goldhagen, 2009.
129. Genocides end when leaders die or are toppled: Valentino, 2004.
130. Ancient historians: Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990, p. 58.
131. Genocide as old as history: Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990, p. xvii.
132. Table of contents of genocides: Kiernan, 2007, p. 12.
133. Democide counts: Rummel, 1994, pp. 45, 70; see also Rummel, 1997, for the raw data. The numerical precision in his estimates is not intended to be an accurate count but to allow others to verify his sources and calculations.
134. Increase Mather praises genocide: Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990, p. 180.
135. Moabites return the favor: Payne, 2004, p. 47.
136. Immortal soul justifies murder: Bhagavad-Gita, 1983, pp. 74, 87, 106, 115, quoted in Payne, 2004, p. 51.
137. Cromwell: Quoted in Payne, 2004, p. 53.
138. Parliamentary reaction: Quoted in Payne, 2004, p. 53.
139. Voice in the wilderness: Quoted in Kiernan, 2007, pp. 82–85.
140. Military codes of honor: Chirot & McCauley, 2006, pp. 101–2. Nothing wrong with genocide: Payne, 2004, pp. 54–55; Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990, pp. 199, 213–14; Goldhagen, 2009, p. 241.
141. Roosevelt on Indians: Courtwright, 1996, p. 109.
142. Lawrence and lethal chamber: Carey, 1993, p. 12.
143. Extermination of the Japanese: Mueller, 1989, p. 88.
144. Origins of the word genocide: Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990.
145. Holocaust denial: Payne, 2004, p. 57.
146. Novelty of genocide memoirs: Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990, p. 8.
147. Conception of history: Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990, p. 8.
148. Rummel’s estimation methods: Rummel, 1994, pp. xvi–xx; Rummel, 1997. See also White, 2010c, note 4, for caveats.
149. Definition of “democide”: Rummel, 1994, chap 2.
150. Great Leap Forward: Rummel has since changed his mind because of revelations that Mao knew about the devastation as it was taking place (Rummel, 2002), but I will stick with his original numbers.
151. Pseudo-governments versus recognized governments: White, 2010c, note 4.
152. Governments prevent more deaths than they cause: White, 2007.
153. Death tolls from major democides: Rummel, 1994, p. 4.
154. Democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian governments and their death tolls: Rummel, 1997, p. 367.
155. Death rates from democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian governments: Rummel, 1994, p. 15.
156. Totalitarian versus democratic governments: Rummel, 1994, p. 2.
157. Form of government matters: Rummel, 1997, pp. 6–10; see also Rummel, 1994.
158. Problem and solution of democide: Rummel, 1994, p. xxi.
159. Hemoclysm: Note that figure 6–7 double-counts some of the deaths in figure 6–1, because Rummel classifies many civilian battle deaths as democides. Also double-counted are some of the deaths in Matthew White’s table on p. 195, which folds wartime genocides into the total count for wars.
160. Trends in democide and democracy: Rummel, 1997, p. 471. Rummel’s regression analyses supporting this point, however, are problematic.
161. Perpetrators of Rwanda genocide: Mueller, 2004a, p. 100.
162. Rwanda genocide was preventable: Goldhagen, 2009; Mueller, 2004a; Power, 2002.
163. New genocide dataset: Harff, 2003, 2005; Marshall et al., 2009.
164. UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset: Kreutz, 2008; Kristine & Hultman, 2007; http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/.
165. Mass killings in mid-1960s to late 1970s: Death figures are geometric means of the ranges in table 8.1 in Harff, 2005, except Darfur, which is taken by converting the magnitude entries from the PITF database to the geometric means of the ranges spelled out in Marshall et al., 2009, and summing them for the years 2003 through 2008.
166. Overestimated genocide death tolls: The Bosnian massacres, for example, probably killed closer to 100,000 than 200,000 people; Nettelfield, 2010. On conflict numbers, see Andreas & Greenhill, 2010.
167. Risk factors for democide: Harff, 2003, 2005.
168. Effects of instability: Harff, 2003, p. 62.
169. Pathways to democide: Harff, 2003, p. 61.
170. Hitler