from Hayes, 2002, based on data in Richardson, 1960.
Richardson also estimated the proportion of deaths that were caused by deadly quarrels of all magnitudes combined, from murders to world wars. The answer was 1.6 percent. He notes: “This is less than one might have guessed from the large amount of attention which quarrels attract. Those who enjoy wars can excuse their taste by saying that wars after all are much less deadly than disease.”75 Again, this continues to be true by a large margin.76
That the two world wars killed 77 percent of the people who died in all the wars that took place in a 130-year period is an extraordinary discovery. Wars don’t even follow the 80:20 rule that we are accustomed to seeing in power-law distributions. They follow an 80:2 rule: almost 80 percent of the deaths were caused by 2 percent of the wars.77 The lopsided ratio tells us that the global effort to prevent deaths in war should give the highest priority to preventing the largest wars.
The ratio also underscores the difficulty of reconciling our desire for a coherent historical narrative with the statistics of deadly quarrels. In making sense of the 20th century, our desire for a good story arc is amplified by two statistical illusions. One is the tendency to see meaningful clusters in randomly spaced events. Another is the bell-curve mindset that makes extreme values seem astronomically unlikely, so when we come across an extreme event, we reason there must have been extraordinary design behind it. That mindset makes it difficult to accept that the worst two events in recent history, though unlikely, were not astronomically unlikely. Even if the odds had been increased by the tensions of the times, the wars did not have to start. And once they did, they had a constant chance of escalating to greater deadliness, no matter how deadly they already were. The two world wars were, in a sense, horrifically unlucky samples from a statistical distribution that stretches across a vast range of destruction.
THE TRAJECTORY OF GREAT POWER WAR
Richardson reached two broad conclusions about the statistics of war: their timing is random, and their magnitudes are distributed according to a power law. But he was unable to say much about how the two key parameters—the probability of wars, and the amount of damage they cause—change over time. His suggestion that wars were becoming less frequent but more lethal was restricted to the interval between 1820 and 1950 and limited by the spotty list of wars in his dataset. How much more do we know about the long-term trajectory of war today?
There is no good dataset for all wars throughout the world since the start of recorded history, and we wouldn’t know how to interpret it if there were. Societies have undergone such radical and uneven changes over the centuries that a single death toll for the entire world would sum over too many different kinds of societies. But the political scientist Jack Levy has assembled a dataset that gives us a clear view of the trajectory of war in a particularly important slice of space and time.
The time span is the era that began in the late 1400s, when gunpowder, ocean navigation, and the printing press are said to have inaugurated the modern age (using one of the many definitions of the word modern). That is also the time at which sovereign states began to emerge from the medieval quilt of baronies and duchies.
The countries that Levy focused on are the ones that belong to the great power system—the handful of states in a given epoch that can throw their weight around the world. Levy found that at any time a small number of eighthundred-pound gorillas are responsible for a majority of the mayhem.78 The great powers participated in about 70 percent of all the wars that Wright included in his half-millennium database for the entire world, and four of them have the dubious honor of having participated in at least a fifth of all European wars.79 (This remains true today: France, the U.K., the United States, and the USSR/Russia have been involved in more international conflicts since World War II than any other countries.)80 Countries that slip in or out of the great power league fight far more wars when they are in than when they are out. One more advantage of focusing on great powers is that with footprints that large, it’s unlikely that any war they fought would have been missed by the scribblers