some security features and helped them tighten their internal controls. The bank began to offer the new check to its customers at the same price as its regular check. It looks just like a regular check, and comes in a lot of colors and styles. The check-fraud losses fell to about $120,000 by 1996, a 96 percent decrease after three years of using the new check. This check is called SafeCheck, and is manufactured by a company that goes by the same name.
People often come up to me and say, You design these secure checks for corporations, why don't you design a check for me, the consumer? So I'm working to produce a secure consumer check. It will have twelve security features, including paper that reacts to twenty-four different chemicals, high resolution borders that are difficult to duplicate, white "chemical-wash detection boxes" that change colors with chemical tampering, and embedded fibers that glow under ultraviolet lights. But I've also told the manufacturers that whenever it takes an order, it has to verify the order with the person's bank. If someone changes his address, that has to be verified. It makes no sense to create a secure check if any criminal can order it.
When I design a check, I follow a little routine. I send a sample to three places: a graphics house in Australia, an Australian forensic document examiner, and a U.S. institute of technology. I ask each of them to create their best replica, so I can test how secure it is. At the institute, they select a smart student and give him access to the most sophisticated computer equipment, literally millions of dollars of gear. The last check I sent there, the student took a month's worth of manhours to produce a good replica. That told me I had a great check. As I've said, nothing is foolproof, but if it takes a clever student a month with millions of dollars of equipment to produce a counterfeit, I know few criminals have a prayer.
The other thing I learn is which features work best. Lately, I've been working with prismatic printing, which puts a multicolored, rainbow-like background on the check. It's very difficult to photocopy.
YOUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE IS YOU
If we're ever going to stop fraud, everyone has got to become a bit more vigilant. My guess would be that half of all Americans don't bother to reconcile their bank statements. They don't even open them. And what they don't realize is that they're liable for errors, because they generally have thirty days to notify their bank of a discrepancy, and sometimes less than that. Let's say I did get hold of your check and I filled it out for $2,000, and you never bothered to look at your bank statement. A month or two later, your husband says, "Hey, we're overdrawn at the bank." You say, "That's impossible. I've got $2,000 in the account." The bank says, "Oh no you don't, you're overdrawn." Now you go back and open that envelope and discover a check for $2,000 that you didn't write. You didn't sign it. Guess what? It's too late. The bank is not going to restore your money. But most people don't realize this until it happens to them.
A Wisconsin man named Borowski had two checking accounts with Firststar Bank. One was his personal account and one was for his father's estate. Borowski said that his fiancee stole $50,000 from his account, and $100,000 from the estate account. She did it with forged checks and unauthorized telephone transfers. She even left forged handwritten notes in the bank's night depository box requesting cashier's checks. When the monthly bank statements and $20,000 in cashier's checks were sent to Borowski, his fiancee intercepted them. When Borowski discovered the theft, he sued the bank to get his money back. Presumably, he also called off his impending marriage.
The case went to court. The bank pointed out that Borowski's signature card agreements required notification to the bank of unauthorized checks within fourteen days of the statement date. Borowski said he hadn't received the statements, because his fiancee got hold of them and lied about them.
The court ruled in favor of the bank. It said that as long as the bank had mailed the statements to the customer's proper address, it had upheld its part of the bargain. The court did rule in favor of Borowski on the $20,000 in cashier's checks, however, because the bank didn't include the handwritten notes with the