by their naval race, by anxiety over control of sea-lanes and access to resources, by competition over who would have what place in the sun—and by growing nationalistic fer vor. Echoes of the Anglo-German naval race can be heard in today’s arguments.
Controversy over the South China Sea has already created some tension between the United States and China. That sea’s 1.3 million square miles are bounded on the west by China, Vietnam (which calls the region the East Sea), and Malaysia, down to Singapore and the Strait of Malacca; and then, coming up on the east, by Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, and at the top, by Taiwan. Through its waters pass most of the trade between East Asia and the Middle East, Africa, and Europe—including most of the energy resources shipped to China, Japan, and South Korea. “It’s really a lifeline of our commerce, of our transport, for all of us, China, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia, and the countries beyond to the west,” said the secretary general of ASEAN, the association of ten Southeast Asian countries.4
In 2002 China and the ASEAN countries signed an agreement that seemed to settle rival claims. But later some Chinese military officials began to speak of China’s “undisputed sovereignty” over the South China Sea, control of which they elevated to what they called hexin liyi, a “core interest.” Others in the China foreign policy community have subsequently described the assertion of “core interest” as “reckless” and “made with no official authorization.” If China were to successfully assert such an interest, it would control the critically important merchant shipping lanes as well as be in a position to deny freedom of passage to the U.S. Navy. Not surprisingly, the ASEAN countries, as well as the United States, have rejected China’s claims. Still, to underline those claims, a Chinese submarine went down to the deepest part of the sea, where its crew planted a Chinese flag.5
Energy resources are an increasingly important part of the argument. Substantial oil and gas resources are produced around the South China Sea, notably in Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia. Estimates of the undiscovered oil in the South China Sea range between 150 billion and 200 billion barrels, which is more than enough to stir competition, although far from proven. Although China and Vietnam have worked out some joint-production agreements, they are at odds over ownership of other exploration areas. Particularly contentious are the Spratly Islands, whose waters are thought to be rich in resources and are claimed in whole or in part by several countries. Meanwhile, in the East China Sea, Japan and China have had a long dispute, which recurrently flares up, over sovereignty and drilling rights.
It is exactly these kinds of tensions that can fester, blow up into incidents, and lead to much more serious and disruptive consequences. That explains the urgency for finding frameworks that can meet the interests of the various nations involved.
“RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS”
While these tensions persist, China’s direct anxiety over energy security appears to have eased. Hu Jintao offered his own answer to the Malacca Dilemma when he presented, at a G8 meeting in 2006, a definition of what he called global energy security in which importing countries like the United States and China are interdependent. Energy insecurity for China, he has said, also means energy insecurity for the United States—and vice versa. Thus collaboration is one of the main answers to the dilemmas of energy security.
Part of this shift is based on China’s growing realization that it can obtain the additional energy it needs by participating in the same global economy from which it has benefited so considerably. In simple words, China can buy the energy it needs. That was not so obvious a few years ago, but experience since has shown that it is eminently feasible. This applies not only to oil but also to natural gas, the imports of which are growing. “There’s no other solution but to rely on the marketplace,” said an energy strategist in Beijing. “What’s different about exporting to America and importing energy from elsewhere? China is part of world markets.”
Moreover, China has very large coal reserves. Adding in domestically produced oil and hydropower, China is more than 80 percent self-sufficient in terms of overall energy. A sign of greater confidence is the change in the discussion about making synthetic oil from coal. This was a very high priority when oil prices were spiking and some people were predicting permanent shortage, but now the Chinese talk about its development more