but the delegation didn’t follow through, probably because they recognized that Pence was not in the mood to be conciliatory. The divergence in messaging—with Moon determined to open dialogue with North Korea and the Trump administration holding steadfast to maximum pressure and confrontation—fueled speculation of an open rift in the alliance.
And that was probably Kim Jong Un’s goal. His more friendly attitude and the unprecedented—and cordial—meeting between his sister and the South Korean president let the air out of U.S. maximum pressure and undermined calls for giving North Korea a “bloody nose.” The more Kim engaged, the more difficult it was to make the argument for a preventive strike, especially as Seoul was trying to couch the Olympic thaw as the beginning of a new era in inter-Korean ties.
KIM’S MAXIMUM PRESSURE AND ENGAGEMENT
During his first six years of rule, Kim relentlessly and unapologetically accelerated his nuclear and ballistic missile programs to highlight North Korea’s strategic relevance and create leverage; now he seemed to be doing the same for engagement. Not only was he good at exerting maximum pressure, but he was also proving adroit at maximum engagement, exploiting the national priorities of the regional players to weaken sanctions pressure.
Kim’s New Year’s address and the “peace Olympics” kicked off a veritable “summit spring.” Van Jackson, an Asia specialist and former Pentagon official, described the thaw in his book On the Brink: “The Olympics helped make the dominant narrative on Korea a hopeful one, about diplomatic progress, with South Korea leading the way.” Kim’s shedding of his isolation “drowned out” the warlike rhetoric coming from Washington. Kim’s sister passed Moon a letter from her brother inviting Moon to visit Pyongyang. Soon after the Olympics, Moon sent National Security Adviser Chung Eui-yong and National Intelligence Service Director Suh Hoon to Pyongyang to meet with Kim. They had “openhearted talk” for more than four hours.
Buoyed by Kim’s comments about improving inter-Korean ties, easing military tension on the Korean Peninsula, and being willing to denuclearize, the envoys released a triumphant statement: “The North Korean side clearly stated its willingness to denuclearize….It made it clear that it would have no reason to keep nuclear weapons if the military threat to the North was eliminated and its security guaranteed.” North Korea also said it wanted a “heartfelt dialogue with the United States on the issues of denuclearization and normalizing relations with the United States,” and that it would refrain from nuclear and ballistic missile tests “while dialogue is continuing.” Beijing welcomed the development, calling for “all relevant parties to seize the current opportunity.” And so did President Trump, who tweeted, “Possible progress being made in talks with North Korea. For the first time in many years, a serious effort is being made by all parties concerned. The World is watching and waiting! May be false hope, but the U.S. is ready to go hard in either direction!” Trump then stunned his advisers, the South Korean envoys, the academic and think tank communities, and the global media when he agreed, in March, apparently on the spur of the moment, to accept Kim’s offer to meet and that he wanted to do so by the end of May.
In the meantime, Kim would hold summits with Moon, in which the two sides would issue the Panmunjom Declaration, which included working toward unification of the Korean Peninsula “led by the Koreans”; fulfilling economic projects; easing military tension by practicing restraint along the DMZ and the disputed Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea, a site of numerous clashes; establishing a peace regime and “bringing an end to the current unnatural state of armistice”; and supporting “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” Moon and Kim also agreed to have regular meetings and direct telephone conversations to “strengthen mutual trust.”
Kim’s statements about a peace regime, denuclearization, economic cooperation, and security guarantees were not new—his father had uttered similar comments as part of his effort to dampen sanctions enforcement and drive a wedge between the United States and its allies. But it was still viewed as an astonishing turn of events that Kim, who had rejected engagement for his entire tenure, would do a 180. Kim’s actions and Moon’s and Trump’s easy acceptance of his statements at face value and their insistence on his “sincerity” muddled conventional thinking about North Korea’s intentions, confused and frustrated Trump’s own advisers and Korea experts who argued that the regime would never fully denuclearize, and energized those who had long believed that political and economic carrots