Road (blog), March 20, 2008; Johannes Friedrich and Thomas Damassa, “The History of Carbon Dioxide Emissions,” World Resources Institute online, last modified May 21, 2014; carbon, parts per million in atmosphere, taken from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration database.
In 1988 . . . Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Reports available at IPCC online, ipcc.ch.
Koch Industries, ExxonMobil, and other firms . . . “alternative” view: Koch Industries: Secretly Funding the Climate Denial Machine (Washington, DC: Greenpeace, March 2010); Connor Gibson, “Koch Industries, Still Fueling Climate Denial,” PolluterWatch, last modified May 9, 2011; Seminar Agenda for “Global Environmental Crises: Science or Politics?” June 5–6, 1991, Cato Institute.
ExxonMobil eventually abandoned this strategy, but Koch Industries persevered: Ellender, interviews by author, 2014–17; Steve Coll, Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 534–56.
Koch Industries officials were even more dismissive: Former senior Koch Industries executive speaking on background, Hoffmann, interviews by author, 2017.
This is what lent the sense of desperation: Phillips, Sharp, interviews by author, 2017.
Markey’s committee realized . . . a more provocative step: Ibid.; “Rep. Markey Announces Revolutionary Global Warming Bill,” press release, May 28, 2008; “Rep. Edward J. Markey Delivers Remarks on Global Warming Legislation at the Center for American Progress,” press release, May 28, 2008; “Rep. Markey: G8 Global Warming ‘Goal’ Doesn’t Reach the Goal Line,” press release, July 8, 2008; information on George H. W. Bush and cap-and-trade law for acid rain, Yergin, The Quest, 476–79.
Koch Industries’ lobbying office . . . majestic stone building: Hoffmann, interviews by author, 2016–17; descriptions of Koch Industries’ lobbying office from notes taken during tour of office and interview of Ellender in its conference room, 2014.
Koch’s lobbying efforts had been fragmented: Former senior Koch Industries political operatives speaking on background, interviews by author, 2014–17; Koch Industries and related companies Lobbying Disclosure Reports, Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2005–10.
Hoffmann led an internal committee at Koch: Hoffmann, interviews by author, 2016–17.
Koch’s team of lobbyists gathered: Ellender, Hoffmann, Kelly Bingel, former senior Koch Industries political operatives speaking on background, interviews by author, 2014–17; descriptions of meeting room taken from notes, 2014.
For all the talk about ideological purity, Ellender’s operation reflected a more complicated reality: Ellender, Hoffmann, Bingel (speaking on background), Phillips, Sharp, Lee Drutman, interviews by author, 2013–17; Drutman, The Business of America Is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) 4–40; Koch lobbying expenditures drawn from Koch Companies Public Sector Lobbying Disclosure Reports, Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives; Koch lobbyist database, Center for Responsive Politics.
Ellender’s team was small, considering the size of their job: Koch Industries and related companies Lobbying Disclosure Reports, Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2005–10; Koch Lobbyist database, Center for Responsive Politics.
One of the lobbyists . . . Kelly Bingel: Bingel, Alex Vogel (former senior Koch Industries political operative speaking on background), interviews by author, 2016–17; Koch Industries expenditures to Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti drawn from Koch Companies Public Sector Lobbying Disclosure Reports, Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives; Koch lobbyist database, Center for Responsive Politics.
There were two ways . . . attention of a politician: Bingel, former congressional staffers speaking on background, two former senior Koch Industries political operatives speaking on background, interviews by author, 2015–17.
David Hoffmann worked for months: Hoffmann, interviews by author, 2016–17.
The meeting convened: Ibid.; chart on “carbon allotments” under Waxman-Markey entitled “Allocation of Cumulative Pollution Allowances in ACES Cap and Trade Program 2012–2025,” produced by the Breakthrough Institute, 2009.
the carbon allotment provision . . . was written by Jonathan Phillips: Phillips, interviews by author, 2017.
the long-held liberal dream . . . starting to look like a reality: Phillips, Sharp, interviews by author, 2017; John M. Broder, “Waxman Advances in Struggle to Wrest Committee from Dingell,” New York Times, November 19, 2008; John M. Broder, “Obama Urges Passage of Climate Bill,” New York Times, June 23, 2009; Teryn Norris and Jesse Jenkins, “Climate Bill Analysis, Part 1: Waxman-Markey Gives Nearly 5 Times More to Polluters Than to Clean Energy,” Breakthrough Institute, May 15, 2009; John M. Broder, “House Republicans Draft Energy Bill with Heavy Focus on Nuclear Power,” New York Times, June 10, 2009.
The committee invited conservative Democrats to negotiate: Phillips, Sharp, interviews by author, 2017; Norris and Jenkins, “Climate Bill Analysis, Part 1.”
His view was not shared by Koch Industries’ lobbyists: Hoffmann, two former senior Koch Industries political operatives speaking on background, interviews by author, 2014–17.
Inglis was a reliably conservative Republican: Bob Inglis, former senior Koch