draconian punishment for those who attempt to defect, engage in unsanctioned market activities, or consume South Korean soap operas, films, books, and music; and his extensive surveillance networks point to his understanding of the potentially destabilizing effects that reforms and relaxation of his regime’s repressive measures might inflict on his country. In addition to these defensive measures, Kim’s creation of his own intranet, his support for a consumer culture and the domestic production of luxury goods and services, and his efforts to modernize regime propaganda to make it more palatable to a population increasingly attracted to South Korean and Chinese tastes reflect his offensive efforts to shape and control his citizens’ minds.
Moreover, as much as the young leader wants prosperity for North Korea, economic reforms and integration would require foreign investment, innovation, entrepreneurship, and attendant incentives to foster development. It would mean greater information flows into the country and among the populace, which would be likely to lead to an unraveling of the mythology that has enshrouded and buttressed the Kim family rule. A prosperous South Korea—a country with an economy that ranks among the global leaders, that shares a border, history, and language, whose people are supposed to be living under the suffocating yoke of American imperialism—poses an existential threat to the Kim regime. Jager concisely sums up this argument: “South Korea’s miraculous story of economic growth and democratic progress threatens the regime’s hold on power precisely because the more North Koreans know about the South, the less likely they are to put up with the conditions of poverty and repression at home.” Moreover, in a post-unification scenario, the elite party and military officials who control the trading companies and the smaller-scale market players would also lose out to more sophisticated, organized, and educated South Korean capitalists.
Kim’s interests thus lie in conflict not peace, in autarky rather than integration, and in the possession of nuclear weapons, which make his survival and long-term Kim family control of the country possible, not denuclearization.
HUBRIS
In fact, we should be concerned that Kim might move toward a more expansive vision of how he could use his nuclear and missile programs to advance offensive objectives—such as creating conditions conducive to the unification of the Korean Peninsula, his grandfather’s dream. He has grown significantly bolder since 2011, having expanded the boundaries of international tolerance for his bad behavior and stopping just short of actions that might lead to U.S. or allied military responses that would threaten his regime. Rather than striving for nuclear war or peace and normalization with the United States, North Korea’s actions, statements, history, and ideology are more consistent with the country’s long-held aspiration for reunification on its own terms. Kim Jong Un’s efforts to diversify nuclear weapons, develop a second-strike nuclear capability, upgrade conventional armaments and training, and improve surveillance and reconnaissance competence certainly appear to be above and beyond North Korea’s stated desire for mere deterrence. A panel of former security officials, academic experts, and CIA analysts concluded in 1998—but it still holds true today—that “the regime derives its ideological legitimacy from its mission to unify Korea.”
Richard Bush, a Brookings scholar and former national intelligence officer for East Asia, wrote in 2017 that “the real danger [of North Korea’s pace and success in its nuclear developments] stems from the possibility of weakened alliances and unchecked escalation in the Korean Peninsula that could spiral out of control.” Bush raised alarms about the “decoupling” issue—the possibility that if North Korea has the capability to hit the United States, Washington would be unwilling to risk San Francisco in order to save Seoul, thus undermining U.S. credibility and influence in the region. Moreover, Kim’s confidence about his ability to deter the United States could lead him to believe that he can conduct conventional attacks against South Korea to probe Seoul’s resolve, expand the space for his maneuvers, sow division within South Korea, and drive a wedge between the United States and its ally. North Korea could do all of these things without using any nuclear weapons—or for that matter, firing artillery. Kim has already succeeded in wielding the peace and diplomacy card to chip away at the U.S. alliance with South Korea and rehabilitated his global image by normalizing North Korea’s nuclear status and repugnant human rights violations, and we know he will continue to do so.
His confidence may be bolstered by the fact that he has yet to face a real “crisis” of the kind that his grandfather and his father