but only if we accept the assumption that North Korea perceives the United States as its only threat and the nuclear weapons program was set up strictly for defensive and deterrence purposes. But that’s not the case. In fact, the Kim family sees a multitude of threats to its survival: the United States, to be sure; South Korea; China; and ultimately, its own people. And since he came to power in December 2011, Kim Jong Un has systematically tackled these challenges through the regime’s nuclear weapons program, coercive diplomacy, and repression.
Let me explain why I believe that Kim is not looking for a peace treaty with the United States. First, the case for getting the United States to agree to a peace declaration and to grant security guarantees depends on the key assumption that Kim’s idea of peace is linked to relinquishing his nuclear weapons. Indeed, a peace declaration and the exchange of a liaison office in Washington and Pyongyang were both under consideration at the Hanoi summit, until the meeting ended abruptly, in part because Kim placed a higher priority on the removal of sanctions rather than on steps that would move the two countries toward a more normal relationship. The history of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the ideological infrastructure that the Kim dynasty has built over the decades, and the regime’s own public statements strongly suggest that peace—from Pyongyang’s perspective—is achievable because it has nuclear weapons.
The regime requires a “hostile” outside world to justify the diversion of scarce resources into military programs, to be able to cast blame on others for the problems in its economy, and to maintain the mythology of the Kim family as the protectors of North Korea’s existence. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, a professor of East Asian Studies, has argued that “the disruption [emphasis in original] of peace has been North Korea’s main strategic goal since 1950, when it invaded South Korea.” The goal of its propaganda, education, and monuments to the Korean War and the guerrilla struggles is to continually revisit and revive fear of the United States. For Kim Jong Un in particular, who overcame the succession odds and doubts about his age and faced down “fire and fury” from the United States, the purported completion of the nuclear weapons program was “a great victory,” and a “powerful treasured sword for defending peace” that would “reliably guarantee” North Korea’s security and prosperity. Following the sixth nuclear test in September 2017 and the tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles that year, NK News reported that North Korean state media held rallies to celebrate the “completion of the state nuclear force” and showed officials giving thanks to Kim for providing for the “eternal rosy future of the country.”
Kim must see good reason to seek to preserve his garrison state. Self-reliance and his political will and leadership got him to the place where his regime could boast about multiple meetings with the U.S. president after having obtained strategic equivalence. He trusts only himself to safeguard North Korea’s security and his own survival. Kim was explicit that the nuclear button is on his desk. If he has learned anything from his country’s history, it is that no one can be trusted, even allies like China and Russia that chose to normalize relations with South Korea and signed on to United Nations sanctions. Japan, the former imperial power and colonizer, cannot be trusted, of course; neither can South Korea, whose various presidents have chosen to punish the regime for terroristic activities and its nuclear weapons program. Add to the mix the tumultuous politics of democratic governments in the United States, South Korea, and Japan—the United States holds presidential elections every four years, with corresponding policy changes; South Korea elects a president who is limited to a single five-year term—which contribute to a low likelihood of long-term sustainability for policies that might be favorable to North Korea. That risk is probably too much for North Korea to entertain.
Kim doesn’t trust his own people either, and like his father and grandfather, he fears the penetration of information that would accompany economic integration with North Korea’s neighbors. He doesn’t have to look too far for examples of what happens when the people are empowered and connected. The yearlong candlelight protests in South Korea, inspired by legitimate grievances against the Park Geun-hye government for its corruption, and fueled by social media wielded by a vibrant civil society, toppled the former dictator’s daughter—the nation’s first female president—in 2017. Kim’s tightening of borders; his