the same time as did the mortars of the North Koreans who had crossed the river: 0935 to 0940.”
The colonel stopped and looked at McCoy.
“Have you ever been under mortar and artillery fire, Captain? Or have you spent your entire career in intelligence?”
“I’ve been under fire, sir.”
“More than once?”
“Yes, sir.”
“Do you remember the first time?”
“Yes, sir.”
“Where was that?”
“In the Philippines, sir. The Japanese used naval gunfire before landing.”
“Were you afraid?”
“Very much, sir.”
“Did you ‘withdraw’?”
“Sir?”
“Did you ‘withdraw’—the new word for that is ‘bug out’?”
“No, sir.”
“Do you remember why not?”
“No, sir,” McCoy said. “We were there to try to repel the landing barges.”
“My first time was in Italy,” the colonel said. “I shat my pants. But I didn’t bug out.”
“Sir?”
“The company commander of Love Company, Captain, within minutes of coming under fire, ‘withdrew.’ Not only personally, but ordered his soldiers to do likewise.”
McCoy did not reply.
“As it turned out,” the colonel went on, “it wasn’t as bad as it could have been. The artillery fire on Love Company was apparently a diversionary attack to conceal their real intention, which was to move to the south in this direction—he pointed—and sever the road here. If they had attacked the deserted positions of Love Company . . .”
“I think I get the picture, sir,” McCoy said.
“I relieved the officer in question, of course, as soon as what he had done came to my attention, but I didn’t come into that information until some time after it happened. By that time—several hours later, whatever time it took them to move three miles against virtually no opposition—approximately three hundred North Korean infantry were here, on this road, near the village of Samyo.
“So was the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, 105-mm howitzers. They had been providing much of my artillery support. The North Koreans launched an immediate attack against them. Tell me, Captain, how are Marine cannoneers armed?”
“Sir?”
“Are they armed with carbines?”
“I’m not sure. It’s my understanding that the officers, and some senior non coms, can elect to carry carbines . . .”
“But the junior NCOs and privates have M1 Garands, and are trained in their use?”
“Sir, every Marine is a rifleman.”
“There were very few Garands in the 63rd Field Artillery, ” the colonel said, matter of factly, “which is the explanation offered for the failure of the 63rd to adequately defend itself by an officer who managed to escape the debacle there.”
“Sir?”
“Wouldn’t you agree that roughly two hundred men— which was the strength of the 63rd—should be able to hold out longer than two hours against three hundred infantry, not supported by artillery?”
“Yes, sir, I would.”
“The enemy attacked the 63rd at approximately 1330. By 1530, the enemy had killed or captured all but a lucky few officers and men who managed to escape, and captured all of the 63rd Field’s vehicles, cannon, and a considerable supply of ammunition.”
“They got all the guns?” McCoy asked, incredulously.
“All of them. And before the 63rd was able to spike them,” the colonel said, confirmed.
“Jesus!” McCoy said.
“At about this time,” the colonel went on, “Item Company learned for the first time that Love Company had bugged out, and that the enemy was astride its road to the rear. The company commander asked for permission to withdraw, and 3rd battalion commander recommended that it be granted; he said that he didn’t think the re-formed Love Company— he described them as ‘demoralized’—could be trusted to counterattack and reopen the road behind Love Company. I gave permission for the withdrawal.”
The colonel let that sink in and then went on.
“It was necessary for them to ‘withdraw’ over the mountains—the roads were in enemy hands—and they eventually made it here. Without a substantial percentage of their crew-served weapons, which simply could not be carried over the mountains.”
The colonel gave McCoy time to absorb that, and then went on:
“I have no reason, Captain, to believe that the 19th Infantry will fare any better than the 34th has, for the same reasons. One of the reasons I believe that to be true is that the division’s third regiment, the 21st Infantry, in three days of fighting, has lost about half its officers and men.”
“Half?”
“Half,” the colonel confirmed. “What was left of the 21st was gathered near Taejon, and reorganized. Reorganized, rather than reconstituted, which implies bringing a unit up to strength. There is no replacement system in place from which replacements for losses can be drawn. What happened to the 21st is that an attempt has been made to form companies and battalions from its remnants.