Ralph, you’re out of your league with this man. Watch yourself!
The Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Japan and United Nations Command thrust most of a triangular piece of fried-egg sandwich into a wide-open mouth, chewed appreciatively, and announced.
“Very nice. I’m glad you thought of this, Howe.”
“I learned to really loathe powdered eggs during the war,” Howe said. “That was the menu at K-1.”
“Not a criticism of you, of course, Howe, but whenever I am served something I don’t like, I remember when we were down to a three-eighths ration on Bataan and Corregidor, and suddenly I am not so displeased.”
Was that simply an observation, or is he reminding me that I am eating a fried-egg sandwich in the presence of the Hero of Bataan and Corregidor?
“Powdered eggs aside, I ate better in Korea just now than I often ate in Italy,” Howe said.
“That’s good to hear, Howe, and it actually brings us to the point of this somewhat rambling conversation we’ve been having.”
Is this it, finally?
“What occurred to me, Howe,” MacArthur went on, “is that Hannibal, Napoleon, and Roosevelt had—and President Truman now has—something I don’t, and, I am now convinced, I really should have.”
“What’s that, sir?”
“And, come to think of it, that General Montgomery was wise enough to have during his campaigns in the Second War: experienced, trusted officers—aides-de-camp in the historical sense of the term—who moved around the battlefield as his eyes and ears, and reported to him what they thought he should know, as differentiated from telling him what they think he would like to hear.”
“Yes, sir, I suppose that’s true.”
“I don’t know where I am going to find such officers to fulfill that role for me—it will have to be someone who is not presently on my staff—but I will. And just as soon as I can.”
Here it comes.
But what did that “it will have to be someone who is not presently on my staff” crack mean?
“I’m sure that you would find that useful, sir.”
“In the meantime, Howe, with the understanding that I am fully aware that your reports to President Truman enjoy the highest possible level of confidentiality, and that I would not ask you to violate that confidence in any way, I sent Colonel Huff to Haneda to ask you to come to see me in the hope that you would be able to share with me what you saw, and felt, in Korea.”
The sonofabitch wants me to tell him what I’m reporting to Truman. Jesus Christ!
“I can see on your face that the idea makes you uncomfortable, Howe, and I completely understand that. Let me bring you up to date on what has happened since you’ve been in Korea, to give you an idea what I’m interested in, and then I will ask you some questions. If you feel free to answer them, fine. If you don’t, I will understand.”
“Yes, sir,” Howe said.
“I don’t think I managed to convince General Collins that the Inchon invasion is the wisest course of action to take—” MacArthur interrupted himself, went to his desk and pulled open a drawer, took out a radio teletype message, and then walked around the desk and handed it to Howe. “Read this, Howe.”
It was an eight-paragraph Top Secret “Eyes Only MacArthur” message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MacArthur waited patiently until Howe had read it.
“Stripped of the diplomatic language, I think you will agree, Howe,” MacArthur said, “that what that doesn’t say is that the JCS approves of Inchon. That they agree with Collins that the invasion—and they don’t even call it an ‘invasion’ but rather a ‘turning operation’—should take place somewhere, preferably at Kunsan, but anywhere but Inchon.”
“That’s what it sounds like to me, sir,” Howe agreed.
“But what it also doesn’t say,” MacArthur went on, “is that I am being denied permission to make the Inchon landing. That suggests to me, frankly, that someone in Washington is reluctant to challenge my judgment about Inchon—and that someone is the President himself. Who else could challenge the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but the President? And why would the President, absent advice he’s getting from person or persons he trusts that I’m right about Inchon and General Collins is wrong, challenge the judgment of the JCS?”
I’ll be damned. He knows—doesn’t know, but has figured out—that Pickering and I both messaged Truman that we think the Inchon invasion makes sense.
“I don’t expect a reply to that, Howe,” MacArthur said. “But let’s say this: Absent orders to the contrary from the