FORCE WHEN IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE RECON FORCE TO FIRE APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (250) ROUNDS OF SMALL-ARMS FIRE AND TWELVE (12) HAND GRENADES AT WHAT WAS BELIEVED TO BE TWO (2) INSURGENT PICKETS ON PERIMETER GUARD. NO DEAD PICKETS WERE FOUND.
3. WHEN THE RECON FORCE ACTUALLY ENTERED THE HEADQUARTERS AREA, THE INSURGENTS HAD FLED INTO THE BUSH, AFTER SETTING "TATU’S” QUARTERS ON FIRE, AND ATTEMPTING OTHER DEMOLITION ACTIVITIES.
4. THE INSURGENTS LEFT BEHIND SUBSTANTIAL STOCKS OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION, FOOD STORES, RADIOTELETYPE EQUIPMENT, SOME DOCUMENTS POSSIBLY OF INTEL VALUE, AND TWO SPIDER MONKEYS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN THE PROPERTY OF “TATU.” SAID SIMIANS HAVE BEEN PLACED INTO THE CUSTODY OF WOJG THOMAS, WHO, FOR PURPOSES OF IDENTIFICATION, HAS NAMED THEM “FIDEL” AND “ERNESTO.”
5. “TATU” AND OTHER FORMER OCCUPANTS OF THE HEADQUARTERS AREA ARE APPARENTLY HEADED FOR LAKE TANGANYIKA. THEY ARE UNDER OUR AERIAL SURVEILLANCE, AND THIS RECON TEAM WILL PURSUE AT A DISCREET DISTANCE.
END
CRAIG FOR HELPER SIX
TOP SECRET
[ FIFTEEN ]
TOP SECRET
EARNEST 0081 0910 ZULU 2 NOVEMBER 1965
VIA WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL AGENCY
FROM: EARNEST SIX
TO: HELPER SIX
1. SECRETARY OF STATE HAS BEEN ADVISED BY U.S. AMBASSADOR, DAR ES SALAAM, THAT CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO TANGANYIKA WAS INFORMED 1600 ZULU 1 NOVEMBER 1965 BY TANGANYIKA FOREIGN MINISTER THAT TANGANYIKA HAS “DECIDED TO END THE NATURE OF THIS ASSISTANCE TO THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT.”
2. US AMBASSADOR WAS INFORMALLY TOLD THIS MEANS TANGANYIKA WILL NO LONGER PERMIT TRANSSHIPMENT OF PERSONNEL OR MATERIEL ACROSS ITS TERRITORY, BUT THAT AS A “HUMAN-ITARIAN” POLICY IT WILL GRANT “TEMPORARY” REFUGE TO ANYONE FLEEING THE CONGO WHO MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN “LIBERATION” ACTIVITIES.
FINTON FOR EARNEST SIX
TOP SECRET
[ SIXTEEN ]
TOP SECRET
HELP0191 1205 ZULU 4 NOVEMBER 1965
VIA WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL AGENCY
FROM: HELPER SIX
TO: EARNEST SIX
1. FOLLOWING IS AN EXERPT OF DECRYPTED RADIOTELETYPE MESSAGE FROM OSCAR FERNÁNDEZ PADILLA, HEAD OF THE CUBAN INTELLIGENCE STATION IN DAR ES SALAAM, TO “TATU” (GUEVARA) (LOCATION UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME) 0900 ZULU 4 NOVEMBER 1965.
BEGIN
I AM SENDING YOU, VIA COURIER, A LETTER FROM FIDEL. ITS KEY POINTS ARE:
1. WE MUST DO EVERYTHING EXCEPT THAT WHICH IS FOOLHARDY.
2. IF TATU BELIEVES THAT OUR PRESENCE HAS BECOME EITHER UNJUSTIFIABLE OR POINTLESS, WE HAVE TO CONSIDER WITHDRAWING.
3. IF TATU THINKS WE SHOULD REMAIN WE WILL TRY TO SEND AS MANY MEN AND AS MUCH MATÉRIEL AS HE CONSIDERS NECESSARY.
4. WE ARE WORRIED THAT YOU MAY WRONGLY FEAR THAT YOUR DECISION MIGHT BE CONSIDERED DEFEATIST OR PESSIMISTIC.
5. IF TATU DECIDES TO LEAVE THE CONGO, HE CAN RETURN HERE OR GO SOMEWHERE ELSE WHILE WAITING FOR A NEW INTERNATIONALIST MISSION.
6. WE WILL SUPPORT WHATEVER DECISION TATU MAKES.
7. AVOID ANNIHILATION.
END
FATHER AND I FOUND PARA 5. INTERESTING
CRAIG FOR HELPER SIX
SECRET
[ SEVENTEEN ]
The Hotel du Lac
Costermansville, Kivu Province
Republic of the Congo
2045 20 November 1965
Captain Weewili/Spec7 Peters found Lieutenant Colonel Dahdi/Major Lunsford sitting on the patio overlooking the lake drinking coffee with Captain Darrell J. Smythe, and Lieutenants Geoffrey Craig and Jack Portet.
“What have you got, Peters?” Lunsford asked, both hope and impatience in his voice.
War is hell, and the worst part of the hell is the goddamned waiting.
Two days before, Guevara had radioed—a voice message in the clear; his cryptographic equipment apparently no longer available to him—to Kigoma, saying that he was withdrawing, and to prepare the launches for the evacuation.
There had been no reply to the message, but since it had been heard by three different American radio intercept teams—one of them now operating outside Kigoma—it seemed reasonable to presume that it had been received by the Cubans in Kigoma.
Unless, of course, the Tanganyikan government had gone further than ending “the nature of its assistance to the Congolese National Liberation Movement” and had shut down the Cuban radio station in Kigoma, or even arrested the Cubans.
That had posed an entirely new problem. If Guevara couldn’t get across Lake Tanganyika, that would, obviously, leave him in the Congo. And there was nothing he could do in the Congo but surrender, or do something stupid, like charging some of Supo’s troops, inviting them to shoot him.
The mission, of course, was to chase the bastard out of the Congo with his tail between his legs, not disappear, and certainly not to get himself on the front pages of the world’s newspapers—
GUEVERA, FAMED FREEDOM FIGHTER, PERISHES IN HEROIC FIGHT TO THE DEATH IN CONGO
About 1600 that afternoon, the ASA intercept operators had intercepted another message—in Morse code, not encrypted— from Guevara, to someone named Changa, who was apparently in charge of the launches in Kigoma. Guevara said that he had two hundred men to evacuate and