Regina stood and addressed the court. “Your Honor, it’s a well-established rule that the State can’t introduce evidence of crimes not charged in an indictment to prove that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. The reason for this rule is obvious. If a person is charged with murder and the State introduces evidence that he committed other unrelated crimes, the jurors might conclude that he must be guilty because he has criminal tendencies.
“If the crimes are similar, though unrelated to the crime alleged in the indictment, it would be a natural human tendency to conclude that the defendant must be guilty of the crime charged because he has committed the same type of crime in the past.”
“Aren’t there exceptions to this rule, Counselor?” Judge Beathard asked.
“Yes, five, but none apply in the case at bar.”
“What are the exceptions, and why don’t they apply to the Gentry evidence?”
“You can get evidence of other crimes before a jury if the evidence tends to establish the following: motive; intent; the absence of mistake or accident; a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; or the identity of the person charged with committing the crime on trial. It is Mr. Chesterfield’s contention that none of these exceptions apply in this case.”
“I think we can all agree that no one sends candy laced with cyanide to someone by mistake or accident,” the judge said. “Would you need to introduce evidence from the Gentry case in our case to prove that Mr. Chesterfield didn’t send the candy by mistake or accident, Mr. Ragland?”
“I might, Your Honor, if the defendant admitted sending the poisoned candy to Mr. Moser but claimed he didn’t know there was poison in the candy.”
“Is that what your client will say, Miss Barrister?” the judge asked.
“Mr. Chesterfield adamantly denies sending the candy to Mr. Moser.”
“Very well, Miss Barrister,” Judge Beathard said. “Let’s move to intent. Mr. Ragland, if you had solid proof that Mr. Chesterfield knowingly sent poison candy to Mr. Moser, it would be crystal clear, wouldn’t it, that he intended to kill Mr. Moser?”
“Yes.”
“So why would you need to introduce evidence from another poisoning case to make your point with the jury?”
Ragland fidgeted for a moment before conceding that he wouldn’t need to introduce evidence from Gentry to show intent under those circumstances.
“Tell me why the motive exception doesn’t apply, Miss Barrister.”
“Mr. Ragland is going to argue that Mr. Moser accused my client of cheating at cards and making unwanted advances to female members and employees of the Westmont Country Club, among other things, and that made Mr. Chesterfield so angry that he gave up his membership in the club. Then Mr. Ragland will argue that Mr. Chesterfield sent the poisoned candy to Mr. Moser because he hated Mr. Moser and wanted revenge.
“In the Gentry case, the State will try to prove that my client and Mr. Gentry were courting Lily Dowd, and Mr. Chesterfield killed Mr. Gentry to get rid of a rival for Mrs. Dowd’s hand.
“These motives are very different and have no relation to each other. Evidence from the Gentry case will not throw any light on the motive that prompted the attempt on Samuel Moser’s life.”
“What do you have to say about motive, Mr. Ragland?” Judge Beathard asked the prosecutor.
“I contend that Mr. Chesterfield hated both men, so hate was the motive for both murders.”
“Can’t you be a rival in love without hating the other suitor?” the judge asked.
“I … It’s possible, I guess,” Ragland conceded grudgingly.
“Even if you established that Mr. Chesterfield did hate his romantic rival, is mere hatred sufficient to get other crimes’ evidence before a jury? Wouldn’t that open the door to admitting any crime in a defendant’s life where he hated the victim?”
“Well, that’s too broad,” Ragland answered.
“Do you have any evidence that Mr. Chesterfield hated Mr. Gentry? Are there phone calls, threatening letters?” the judge asked.
Ragland looked flustered. “Not that we have discovered so far.”
“Why can’t Mr. Ragland introduce the Gentry evidence to prove a common scheme or plan?” the judge asked Regina.
“To bring a case within this exception to the general rule, the two crimes must be connected as parts of a plan or so related as to show a common motive or intent running through both,” Regina said. “The case before the court provides an excellent example of a situation where the exception applies. Evidence of the