a large self-sufficient installation with a garrison of 3,000 by 1939-40 (reduced to 1,500 in 1945).
Intensive efforts were extended to develop BW into a practical weapon, at least eight types of special bombs being tested for large-scale dissemination of bacteria.
The most thoroughly investigated munition was the Uji type-50 bomb. More than 2,000 of these bombs were used in field trials. The Ha bomb, too, was exploded experimentally. Note that whereas the Uji bomb was an all-purpose munition, the Ha bomb was constructed and produced with only one purpose in mind – the dispersion of anthrax spores. The immediate effect was gained by shrapnel bursts with secondary considerations given to ground contamination. The statement has been made that a scratch wound from a single piece of shrapnel was sufficient to produce illness and death in 50-90% of the horses, and in 90-100% of the sheep exposed in experiments. More than 500 sheep were used in such field trials and estimates of horses similarly expended vary from 100 to 200.
Employing static techniques and drop tests from planes, approximately 4,000 bombs were used in field trials at Pingfan.
By 1939, definite progress had been made, but the Japanese at no time were in a position to use BW as a weapon. However, their advances in certain bomb types was such as to warrant the closest scrutiny of the Japanese work.
Japanese offensive BW was characterized by a curious mixture of foresight, energy, ingenuity and at the same time, lack of imagination with surprisingly amateurish approaches to some aspects of the work.
Organisms which were considered as possible candidates for BW, and which were tested in the laboratory or in the field included: all types of gastrointestinal bacterial pathogens, P. pestis (plague), B. anthracis (anthrax) and M. malleomyces (glanders).
Japanese defensive BW stresses:
a) Organizations of fixed and mobile preventive medicine units (with emphasis on water purification).
b) An accelerated vaccine-production program.
c) A system of BW education of medical officers in all echelons (BW Defensive Intelligence Institute).
The principal reasons for the Japanese failure were:
a) Limited or improper selection of BW agents.
b) Denial (even prohibition) of cooperated scientific effort.
c) Lack of cooperation of the various elements of the army (e.g. ordnance).
d) Exclusion of civilian scientists, thus denying the project the best technical talent in the Empire.
e) A policy of retrenchment at a crucial point in the development of the project.
CONCLUSIONS:
It is the opinion of the investigating officer that:
a) If a policy had been followed in 1939 which would have permitted the reasonably generous budget to be strengthened by an organization with some power in the Japanese military system, and which would have stressed integration of services and cooperation among the workers, the Japanese BW project might well have produced a practical weapon.
b) However, since the Japanese dreaded the United States’ capacity for retaliating in kind (i.e. BW) or with chemical warfare agents, it is most unlikely that they would have used a BW attack against American troops even if the weapon had been at hand.
c) The Japanese are fully aware of the reasons for the failure in their development of BW. It is extremely unlikely that they would repeat their mistakes.
SUPPLEMENT 1a, ATTACHED TO DOCUMENT:
Map indicating that the Japanese army had ‘water purification units’ attached to their 18th, 31st, 33rd, 49th, 53rd, 54th, 55th, and 56th Divisions stationed in Burma, with larger fixed field ‘water purification units’ at Rangoon and Mandalay.
DISTRIBUTION
Report on Scientific Intelligence Survey
Agency Vol. V
C/S, GHQ, AFPAC 1
Chief Surgeon, GHQ, AFPAC 2
Chief Chemical Officer, GHQ, AFPAC 2
Nav. Tech. Jap. 2
A C of S, G-2
Att: War Department Intelligence Target Section. 3
War Department, G-2
Att: Scientific Branch 39
Air Technical Intl. Group, FEAF 2
Lt. Col. M. Thompson 1
Stencils have been sent to G-2, War Department, where additional copies may be made available upon request.
– Report ends –
*
Marked PERSONAL
Dai-Ichi Hotel, Tokyo, Japan
November 18, 1945
My dearest Peggy,
I hope, with all my heart, that you and the children are all well. As you know, I had hoped (& prayed) to be home with you all by now or, at the very latest, for Thanksgiving.
Unfortunately, things have taken a turn for the worse here. I know now that they have lied to me (these Japs) & my work here is far from done. I realize that they flattered me in order to distract me, faking respect for my reputation & my work at the College of Physicians & Surgeons. I realize, too, that I have been blinded by their titles & ranks, their own reputations & work.
There is something, however, I should have told you before but