The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Vio - By Steven Pinker Page 0,440

James, 1906/1971.

120. Belloc wanted war: Mueller, 1989, p. 43.

121. Valéry wanted war: Bell, 2007a, p. 311.

122. Sherlock Holmes wanted war: Gopnik, 2004.

123. Why the Great War happened: Ferguson, 1998; Gopnik, 2004; Lebow, 2007; Stevenson, 2004.

124. 8.5 million: Correlates of War Inter-State War Dataset, Sarkees, 2000; 15 million: White, in press.

125. Anti-Enlightenment ideologies in Germany, Italy, and Japan: Chirot, 1995; Chirot & McCauley, 2006.

126. Cold War as containment of communist expansionism: Mueller, 1989, 2004a.

127. 19th-century peace movements: Howard, 2001; Kurlansky, 2006; Mueller, 1989, 2004a; Payne, 2004.

128. Ridiculing pacifists: Mueller, 1989, p. 30.

129. Shavian accompaniment: Quoted in Wearing, 2010, p. viii.

130. What Angell really wrote: Ferguson, 1998; Gardner, 2010; Mueller, 1989.

131. War no longer justified: Luard, 1986, p. 365.

132. All Quiet on the Western Front: Remarque, 1929/1987, pp. 222–25.

133. A mountain . . . cannot offend a mountain: Remarque, 1929/1987, p. 204.

134. War aversion among most Germans in the 1930s: Mueller, 1989, 2004a.

135. Alternatives to Hitler would not have started World War II: Turner, 1996.

136. Hitler’s demonic genius: Mueller, 1989, p. 65. Hitler manipulating the world: Mueller, 1989, p 64.

137. We’re doomed: See Mueller, 1989, p. 271, notes 2 and 4, and p. 98.

138. Morgenthau on World War III: Quoted in Mueller, 1995, p. 192.

139. Cold War superpowers stayed out of each other’s way: This included Korea, where the Soviet Union provided only limited air support to its North Korean ally, and never closer than sixty miles from the battlefront.

140. Longest great power peace since the Roman Empire: Mueller, 1989, pp. 3–4; Gaddis, 1989.

141. No army crossing the Rhine: B. DeLong, “Let us give thanks (Wacht am Rhein Department),” Nov. 12, 2004, http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/movable_type/2004–2_archives/000536.html.

142. No interstate wars in Western Europe: Correlates of War Inter-State War Dataset (v3.0), Sarkees, 2000.

143. No interstate wars in Eastern Europe: Correlates of War Inter-State War Dataset (v3.0), Sarkees, 2000. This follows the CoW definition of interstate war as a conflict with one thousand casualties in a year and members of the interstate system on each side. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 is not included in the current CoW databases, which end in 1997; the PRIO Dataset counts it as an internationalized intrastate (civil) war, because NATO entered in support of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Note that Levy’s criteria would include it as a war involving a great power.

144. No interstate wars between developed countries: Mueller, 1989, pp. 4 and 271, note 5.

145. The decline of conquest since 1948: An exhaustive review by the political scientist Mark Zacher (Zacher, 2001) lists seven: India-Goa (1961), Indonesia–West Irian (1961–62), China–Northeast Frontier (1962), Israel-Jerusalem/West Bank/Gaza/Golan (1967), North Vietnam–South Vietnam (1975), Iran–Strait of Hormuz Islands (1971), and China–Paracel Islands (1974). A few other successful aggressions resulted in minor changes or in the establishment of new political entities.

146. Greatest transfer of power in history: Sheehan, 2008, pp. 167–71.

147. No more colonial or imperial wars: Human Security Centre, 2005; Human Security Report Project, 2008.

148. No states eliminated: Zacher, 2001.

149. Twenty-two states occupied in first half of 20th century, none in second half: Russett & Oneal, 2001, p. 180.

150. Danes roaring for a fight: Mueller, 1989, p. 21.

151. Longest period of great power peace: Levy et al., 2001, p. 18.

152. Chance of one great power war in sixty-five years: In 1991 Levy had to exclude the Korean War to calculate that the probability of the number of observed great power wars since the end of World War II was just 0.005 (see Levy et al., 2001, note 11). Two decades later we don’t have to make that judgment call to get massive statistical significance.

153. Improbability of the Long Peace: The rates of onsets per year of wars between great powers, and of onsets per year for wars with a great power on at least one side, between 1495 and 1945, were taken from Levy, 1983, table 4.1, pp. 88–91. The rates of onsets per year for wars between European states from 1815 through 1945 were taken from the Correlates of War Dataset, Sarkees, 2000. These were multiplied by 65 to generate the lambda parameter for a Poisson distribution, and the probability of drawing the number of observed wars or fewer was calculated from that distribution.

154. Precocious assessments of war decline: Levi, 1981; Gaddis, 1986; Holsti, 1986; Luard, 1988; Mueller, 1989; Fukuyama, 1989; Ray, 1989; Kaysen, 1990.

155. “Postwar” world: Jervis, 1988, p. 380.

156. Anxious prediction: Kaysen, 1990, p. 64.

157. War no longer desirable: Keegan, 1993, p. 59.

158. War may not recur: Howard, 1991, p. 176.

159. Striking discontinuity: Luard, 1986, p. 77.

160. Nothing like it in