the Army Douglas MacArthur, who took a quick look around, then radioed the Pentagon that U.S. troops were going to be necessary.
While this was going on, the United Nations, realizing that the North Koreans had no intention of obeying the UN resolution to cease, desist, and get out of South Korea, issued—on 27 June—another one:
“. . . recommends that the members of the UN furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack. . . .”
Resisting the Communist attack would be an action of the United Nations, rather than a unilateral action by the United States.
Just before 0500 30 June, President Truman got MacArthur’s assessment of the Korean situation and his request for authorization to use American ground troops. Truman immediately authorized the deployment of one regimental combat team, and after thinking it over for two hours, authorized the deployment of two infantry divisions.
At 0800 1 July “Task Force Smith”—400 officers and men from the 21st Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, under Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith—boarded USAF C-54 transports at Itazuke Air Force Base in Japan and were flown to Korea.
It was not the regimental combat team Truman had authorized. It was all the men the 24th Division could muster on short notice.
On the morning of 5 July, Task Force Smith was in place on the Suwon-Osan Highway, south of Suwon. The “crew-served” weapons with which it was supposed to halt the North Korean Army consisted of two 75-mm recoilless rifles; two 4.2-inch mortars; six 2.36-inch rocket launchers; and four 60-mm mortars. The 52nd Field Artillery—six light 105-mm howitzers—had been assigned to them.
When the North Koreans’ Russian-built T-34 tanks attacked, they were engaged by Task Force Smith’s 75-mm recoilless rifles. The projectiles bounced off the Russian armor. So did the 2.36-inch rockets. So did the shells from the 105-mm howitzers.
On the morning of 6 July, Colonel Smith was able to muster only 248 officers and men of the original 400. The artillery had lost five officers and twenty-six men and most of its cannon.
And they had managed to delay—not stop—the North Koreans for less than seven hours.
More troops were going to be needed, and quickly. The problem was, there were no more troops.
The Marine Corps was ordered to furnish a division. There were two Marine divisions: The First, in California, was at less than half wartime strength, and the Second, on the East Coast, was in even worse shape. At Headquarters, USMC, Major Drew J. Barrett, Jr.,1 a junior G-1 staff officer, marched into the office of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to report that there was no way the Corps could meet the requirements laid on it by the Commander-in-Chief except by mobilizing the entire reserve. This was done.
The Eighth Army, under General Walton H. “Johnny” Walker, who had served with distinction under Patton in Europe, began a series of delaying actions—in other words, retreated—down the Korean Peninsula.
On 4 August, the Pusan Perimeter was established. This was a small enclave at the tip of the peninsula. The alternative to the perimeter was being pushed into the sea.
Reinforcements began to arrive from Japan, Hawaii, and the continental United States. By gutting the 2nd Marine Division on the East Coast, the Marine Corps was able to form from the 1st Marine Division the First Marine Brigade (Provisional) and send it to Korea.
General Walker immediately made the Marines his “Fire Brigade,” moving it around within the perimeter to reinforce whatever Army units seemed most vulnerable to the continuing North Korean attack.
MacArthur, meanwhile—while there was still genuine doubt that Walker could hold the Pusan Perimeter—was planning a counterattack. He was later to claim he’d first thought of it when he’d made his first quick visit to Korea.
It is a matter of record that MacArthur, in early July, had ordered his chief of staff, Major General Edward M. Almond, to plan for a landing on the west coast of the peninsula.
When he finally revealed his plan—to make an amphibious landing at Inchon, the port near Seoul—it was greeted with reactions ranging from “grave doubts” to mutters of “absolute insanity” from just about every senior officer made privy to it.
It was the worst possible place to stage an amphibious landing. There was a long list of things wrong with the plan, primarily the “landing beach” itself.
To get to the “landing beach” the invasion fleet would have to navigate the narrow Flying Fish Channel, which was not navigable except at high tide, and then only for two