No Dream Is Too High - Buzz Aldrin Page 0,33
pack. Because we didn’t attempt to spacewalk with the jet pack, we lost valuable time in which the technology for maneuvering in space could have progressed much more rapidly. On the other hand, I knew that if NASA did not deem the experiment safe and something went wrong, I might still be floating around somewhere in space, so I resigned myself to being content. Later, during the space shuttle and space station missions, astronauts were able to maneuver on their own using the jet packs. Lucky dogs!
My second regret is much more serious. I regret that I didn’t warn NASA more emphatically about the problems I saw with the space shuttle.
Shortly after I returned to Earth, after Apollo 11, I attended a meeting in Huntsville, Alabama, to view new spacecraft designs and to learn about a new space program along with a number of NASA officials, aerospace engineers, and rocket manufacturers. This program was intended to be NASA’s next big step, after Apollo.
While there, I was somewhat surprised to learn that our next foray into space would include an orbiter with wings and with wheels that could land on a runway, as well as a booster, also with wings and wheels to land on a runway. The program had generated great interest. At the meeting, at least seven aerospace manufacturers touted their rockets and boosters on which they were already working. They had models built in 1970 regarding the seven configurations and stages of the program to follow Apollo.
Today, we would be delighted to have a fully reusable orbiter to take the crew only, a booster to get them there, and then a return to Earth for both of them. We’d love to have that.
Why don’t we have that? Because of a grave design flaw.
When I studied the models, I observed that the boosters in the models had windows. That was a surprise to me. After all, why would you want windows in a booster with nobody in it?
I was informed that a crew of two astronauts would travel inside the booster to the space station, and then return in the booster to land back on Earth.
I worried about the crew in the booster during launch and said so. I thought it was unwise because of the expense, but even more so because of the danger to the astronauts.
During a launch, if something goes wrong, the top concern is for the safety of the astronauts in the orbiter. Generally, the lower stages of a launch can be destroyed relatively easily, simply by triggering the “Destruct” button. But that step could not be taken safely with a crew sitting atop the rocket in a booster.
I didn’t make a big deal about it at the meeting in Huntsville, but I spoke candidly about my concerns when I returned to the Manned Space Center in Houston. I should have spoken more strongly and been more emphatic. Perhaps if I had objected in front of the aerospace companies that had done the studies about manned boosters versus unmanned boosters, I could have made a case for the safety of the astronauts.
The NASA people who would be sitting in the control center during ignition and liftoff had been in the Huntsville meeting, so it wasn’t really my responsibility to point out something wrong with the booster—namely, having people in it!
But had I expressed my opinion in stronger terms, maybe someone would have paid more attention. Unfortunately, we were still trying to stay ahead of the Russians, so there was undue haste in rushing the space shuttle construction process. The haste in putting together the reusable shuttle that had crew and cargo together exacerbated the dangerous situation. They didn’t have room for the fuel, so they put the fuel in a separate tank and then had to boost it with solid rockets, one of which failed and caused the Challenger accident. The same configuration contributed to the ice that broke off and hit the wing on the Columbia, causing another tragic accident.
I had expressed my concerns on these issues with NASA many months before the Challenger and Columbia tragedies, but NASA gave me the impression that they weren’t interested in my ideas for improving the system, so I let it drop.
I was living in California on February 1, 2003, when the Columbia space shuttle was scheduled to return from the International Space Station. I had penciled onto my handwritten calendar (remember those?) that the Columbia was to land at the Kennedy Space Center at 9 a.m.