for what they’re up to, Mr. President, we can’t think in those terms yet. We need to concentrate on what they’re capable of, then work forward to intention.”
“Explain that,” National Security Adviser Ann Reynolds said.
Translation: I don’t know what the hell you’re talking about. Like Scott Kilborn, the Democratic congresswoman from Michigan was unqualified in the extreme, but both her demographically friendly gender and her seat on the House Intelligence Committee had made her a shoo-in for Kealty’s cabinet. As the CEO of a Detroit-based social-networking website company, Reynolds had been savvy and capable, skills she assumed were easily transferable to the role of politician and legislator. Netters suspected it hadn’t quite sunk in that she was in over her head, a fact that scared the living hell out of him. The National Security Adviser was white-knuckling it, hoping her Donna Karan power suits, severe glasses, and rapid-fire speaking style would keep the wolves at bay.
“Say I intend to beat the Olympic record for the marathon. That’s my intention. Problem is, both my legs are broken and I’ve got a heart condition. That’s my capacity. The latter dictates the former.”
Reynolds nodded sagely.
Scott Kilborn, the DCI, said, “Mr. President, Tehran is going to call it an ‘exercise,’ but we can’t ignore the obvious: First of all, the force is moving toward the Ilam salient—as the crow flies, it’s as close to Baghdad as any point in Iran. Eighty or so miles. Second, we just put into motion our drawdown plan in Iraq. Best case, they’re sending a warning to the Sunnis to mind their manners. Worst case, this is the real deal and they’re planning an incursion.”
“To what end?”
Kealty had asked the question, which was good, Netters thought, but there was no curiosity behind it. When it came to Iraq, the President was solution-focused to a fault. From day one, he’d made it clear that he intended to withdraw U.S. forces as quickly as possible, with only token regard paid to tactical safety. Kealty lacked two critical ingredients for good leadership: flexibility and curiosity. He had each in abundance in the political arena, but that was about power, not genuine leadership.
“Testing the waters, see how we react,” Kilborn replied. “The longer we delay in drawing down, the more time Tehran has to work behind the scenes with the Shia militias. If an incursion doesn’t reverse our drawdown now they’ve got a preview.”
“I disagree,” Admiral Netters said. “They’ve got nothing to gain and everything to lose by crossing the border. Moreover, they’re light on triple-A.”
“Explain.”
“They’re fielding only token antiair elements. That’s not an oversight. They know if we come at them, it’ll be from carriers in the Gulf first.”
Kealty’s National Security Adviser, Ann Reynolds, said, “A message?”
“Again, Ms. Reynolds, that falls into the ‘intentions’ category, but I’ll tell you this much: For all their shortcomings, the Iranians aren’t blind, and they’re big believers in the Soviet order of battle model, which is big on mobile antiaircraft systems. They saw what we did during Gulf One and Two, and they haven’t forgotten it. You don’t strip out your antiair elements just for the hell of it.”
“What about air cover?” This from NSA Reynolds. “Fighters?”
“No change,” Netters replied. “Nothing moving but routine patrol flights.”
President Kealty was frowning. A fly in his soup, Netters thought. He’d promised the country he’d get the United States out of Iraq, and the clock was ticking, but not on the troops or America’s strategic welfare but rather on Kealty’s chances for a second term. Of course, Netters had from the outset his own reservations about the Iraq War, and he still did, but those were dwarfed by the very real possibility of getting it wrong over there. Like it or not, the United States was up to its eyeballs in the Middle East, more so than it had in perhaps its entire history. A painless withdrawal was a pipe dream Kealty had sold to an understandably war-weary nation. While the current drawdown plan would never succeed, it was measured enough that Iraq would slowly slip into chaos rather than fall headfirst into it, in which case he hoped Kealty would have the good goddamned sense to regroup and listen to the theater commanders.
In one respect, Scott Kilborn was correct: This business on the border may well be a preview of Kealty’s endgame for Iraq without American troops, though whether Iran would actually put troops on the ground once U.S. forces were gone was anyone’s guess. If they did, however,