of the production of sodium cyanide, which can be deadly on its own or developed into the nerve agent tabun, which is banned by the Security Council. It also called for Pyongyang to abide by the 2016 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2270, in which the international community called for North Korea to abandon all chemical and biological weapons and weapons-related programs.
In addition to the potential for deploying weapons of mass destruction in a conflict with the United States or South Korea, North Korea’s latent or existing biological and chemical capabilities also pose proliferation risks. For at least two decades, the regime has been reportedly providing chemical weapons–related assistance and technology to Syria, Iran, Egypt, and Libya. In 2009, for example, the Greek government inspected a merchant vessel headed for Syria and seized four shipping containers with thirteen thousand chemical protective suits and other items that were made in North Korea.
Kim Jong Nam’s assassination in 2017 and North Korea’s flouting of international norms and sanctions in recent years in its development of multiple potential weapons of mass destruction underscore Kim Jong Un’s brazenness and confidence about his ability to get away with murder, literally and figuratively. Although Washington redesignated North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in November 2017 (Iran, Syria, and Sudan are also on the list), in part in response to the Malaysia assassination, and slapped on additional sanctions, Kim Jong Un almost certainly assesses that he can manage the fallout of his actions. Pyongyang had been a member of this ignominious club from 1988 to 2008 for its abductions of Japanese citizens, bombings and assassination attempts against South Korea, and commercial airline hijackings, but it was removed by the George W. Bush administration in an attempt to stimulate flagging negotiations on denuclearization and the regime’s “authoritative and direct public statement affirming that it does not support international terrorism now and will not support international terrorism in the future.”
But for Kim, this trade-off must be worth it, in that he assuredly sees the development of weapons of mass destruction as a way to strengthen his hand in his relationship with the United States, improve the North’s defenses in a potential wartime situation, and add more luster to his desired image as a tough leader. After all, even Secretary of State Rex Tillerson admitted as much, stating that the State Sponsor of Terrorism designation was a symbolic move: “The practical effects may be limited but hopefully we’re closing off a few loopholes with this.” Meanwhile, two young women in Malaysia were for a time facing the possibility of the death penalty for their role in Kim Jong Nam’s murder, while the regime suffered few, if any, real consequences. Given the fact that Huong and Aisyah were released from prison in early 2019, all involved in the killing have been absolved of responsibility.
The relisting of North Korea on the United States’ State Sponsors of Terrorism list occurred as relations between the two countries reached a nadir in 2017, sparking fears about a nuclear conflagration. Kim’s confidence, fueled by the apprehension of those around him and his evident success in extinguishing potential rivals, would give him the energy to confront his biggest adversary and his most powerful challenger: the president of the United States.
As Kim Jong Un entered his seventh year in power, he could count several successes. He had made significant headway in solidifying his power and installing loyalists. He had made progress in advancing the byungjin policy of advancing both the economy and the nuclear weapons program, building monuments of leisure and monuments for national defense, and seemingly ushering in a new and modern North Korea after decades of decline following the end of Soviet aid and the great famine of the 1990s. He had developed and advanced his nuclear and missile programs and tested new designs from multiple locations, fulfilling his goal of “diversifying” the nuclear weapons program. He had successfully demonstrated nonnuclear capabilities, wielding North Korea’s cyber and chemical weapons expertise against his enemies. And not only had Kim poked and prodded the limits of international tolerance and challenged and defied global norms and gotten away with it—little more than a heap of sanctions were levied, which fell far short of posing a real threat to his regime—he’d outlasted his three main adversaries: Barack Obama, Park Geun-hye, and her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak. Unlike Kim, Presidents Obama, Park, and Lee were elected through a democratic process and left office—Obama and Lee after elections in their countries