and intimate—was a message to any challengers. Although Kim almost certainly ordered the assassination, it’s unclear whether he micromanaged the event or if he left the planning and execution to his operatives. One can imagine that he was quite pleased with those who orchestrated the killing, for its sophistication, its deniability, and the drama that unfolded in its aftermath.
No dissenter or perceived dissenter is safe, whether he or she is in Pyongyang, like Uncle Jang, or, like Jong Nam, in a seemingly safe place—the bustling international hub of Kuala Lumpur—supposedly under the care of the Chinese government. The success of North Korean special operatives, who could conduct a sensitive, skilled attack in a public setting, and their use of a chemical weapon were a lesson to all who watched the videos and read about the killing. Plastered as it was all over the international and regional media, the assassination was proof that Kim’s reach and revenge have no limits.
THE PLAYBOY AND THE PURIST
Kim Jong Nam knew he had a target on his back. One of his friends said, “He wasn’t paranoid, but he was worried….When he was out he was careful, and he avoided talking to Asians because he was worried they were spies.” The head of South Korea’s National Intelligence Service revealed in 2017 that Jong Nam, aware that Jong Un had been trying to assassinate him since 2011, had written to his brother in 2012, asking him to spare his life and that of his family. But he tried to lead a normal life in China, under Beijing’s protection, getting married and having children there in the 1990s. He traveled regularly, to Southeast Asia and Europe, where his son was studying in France, and posted photos of himself at various locations on his Facebook page, under the pseudonym Kim Chol, which was also the name on his passport. His puffy face, bloated belly, and unshaven stubble were telling signs of a life of leisure, drink, and rich foods, while his Ferragamo loafers, fancy hats and sunglasses, and other designer clothes exuded a very un–North Korean aesthetic, a stark contrast to his younger brother’s drab Mao jacket and matching slacks, severe haircut, and dark horn-rimmed glasses.
Kim Jong Nam reportedly never met the younger brother who had usurped their father’s affections. Thirteen years Jong Un’s senior, Jong Nam had become the face of what could have been in North Korea, as international media speculated about his real or perceived reformist tendencies and what changes he would bring to North Korea if he were named to lead the country. Jong Nam’s occasional comments to the Japanese and South Korean press containing direct or oblique criticisms of the regime did not help endear him to his brother in Pyongyang. Although Jong Nam had refrained from openly criticizing North Korea in recent years, the fact that he was still in the public eye and posting his lifestyle on Facebook no doubt irritated Jong Un, who was demonstrably unable to completely control his brother. And for a regime that was obsessed and paranoid about stability and control, Jong Nam was an obvious outlier, not least because despite his stated desire to remove himself from politics, his very existence fostered as yet unrequited dreams about North Korean reform.
Perhaps Jong Un hated his brother—Westernized, gluttonous, corrupted—for what he represented. Jong Nam frequented brothels and reportedly had multiple girlfriends, while Jong Un portrays himself as a devoted husband to his wife, as evidenced by how often she accompanies him in public. While his brother indulged himself and gambled, Jong Un worked tirelessly to preserve the legacy of their grandfather and father and the country’s sovereignty and strength. Jong Nam was effete and enslaved by his luxurious lifestyle, while Jong Un crisscrossed North Korea tending to his people’s livelihood. Jong Nam was dependent on China for protection, while Jong Un was developing advanced nuclear and ballistic missile programs to preserve the North’s dignity and independence. For Jong Un, his older brother might have been an alter ego, a degenerate who served as an example of what happens when one is not vigilant about hewing close to the regime’s ideology, an entity at the extreme end of the spectrum from purity of thought and action as embodied in Kim Jong Un, the loyal son, father, husband, leader.
There was no possible redemption for Kim Jong Nam. And as for Uncle Jang, who also veered from the righteous path, elimination of the rot was the only option, according