Denuclearization is a primary goal of any solution; another high priority is choking off North Korea’s ability to generate revenue for the regime and its nuclear weapons program, which has grown by leaps and bounds since he came to power—it is more diverse, more mobile, and more dangerous—and poses unacceptable threats to global security.
But we also have to keep an eye on the multiple dimensions of the North Korean threat that have metastasized since Kim came to power, as well as how his perception of the hazards that loom inside and outside his country is developing and changing. Kim’s personalization of the nuclear weapons program and promises of a socialist fairyland—and ownership of the man-to-man diplomacy with Trump, Xi, Moon, and Putin—could put an unwelcome and dangerous spotlight on his failure to deliver on his promise to improve North Korea’s economy. Shaking Kim’s key assumptions about his freedom of action, maintaining a long-term strategy that breaks the cycle of provocation and reward, and raising the costs for his bad behavior will require Washington’s credibility to follow through, close cooperation among the United States, the Northeast Asian countries, and the international community to defend and deter against North Korean adventurism, and, perhaps most frustratingly, time.
To intensify North Korea’s internal contradictions, sharpen the choices that Kim has to make, and alter his risk calculus, the United States, its regional allies, and the global community must undertake coordinated and consistent actions—a calibration of pressure and negotiations in public and private—toward convincing Kim that nuclear weapons make his survival less rather than more secure. Sanctions and economic carrots—and threats of military action—are unlikely to get him to budge on abandoning his arsenal, unless we also acknowledge and exploit the totality of Kim’s fears, concerns, and desires. Our policies should aim at both external pressure and methods to increase the domestic costs for Kim. The central question, then, is not how do we make Kim feel more “secure” by giving him what he demands, as some activists and academics argue, but rather, how do we alter Kim’s calculus in a way that compels him to believe that nuclear weapons are a greater threat to his rule and dynastic preservation than an asset?
To do so, we must first focus on alliances. Any real or perceived fissures among allies and partners, as well as questions about U.S. credibility and commitment to the region, only play to Kim’s advantage, affording him the space to disrupt regional stability and conduct acts of violence that fall just below the threshold for regional or international military retaliation that could threaten the survival of his regime. North Korea has threatened to test a hydrogen bomb in the Pacific. It continues to bolster its ability to attack Japan and South Korea and has in the past engaged in deadly attacks against South Korea. It continues cyberactivities to generate revenue for the regime. And it is a proliferator of conventional and unconventional weapons, having transferred missiles and related technologies to Iran and Syria. North Korea has used these tactics even during periods in which it was engaging in diplomacy.
Unequivocal declarations and demonstrations of U.S. commitment to its alliances and its allies’ security and increased regional defense cooperation, especially between South Korea and Japan, would temper North Korea’s proclivity to undertake actions that undermine regional stability. As Ryan Hass, the former China director at the National Security Council, and I have argued in a Brookings Foreign Policy Brief, the first thing that Washington and its allies Seoul and Tokyo should do is develop a menu of options that the three countries are jointly prepared to execute to minimize the North Korean threat, and also use that menu to present Beijing with the choice of either cooperating or stepping aside as the three parties move forward. The list could include covert and overt actions against North Korea, as well as steps that Seoul and Tokyo would take to strengthen their own security if certain threatening conditions are reached. Such an agreement would reduce the potential for Japan and South Korea to take unilateral actions that could undercut global efforts against North Korea, while encouraging Beijing to put pressure on Pyongyang rather than shield it.
Second, we need to maintain and build on maximum pressure sanctions designed to create leverage in negotiations, prevent the proliferation of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile technologies, and retard their efforts to make additional nuclear advancements. But sanctions don’t implement themselves and they need time to work. They require U.S.